Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 105 | Issue 4

Article 6

Fall 2015

Who Could it be Now? Challenging the Reliability
of First Time In-Court Identifications After State v.
Henderson and State v. Lawson
Aliza B. Kaplan
Janis C. Puracal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminology Commons
Recommended Citation
Aliza B. Kaplan and Janis C. Puracal, Who Could it be Now? Challenging the Reliability of First Time In-Court Identifications After State v.
Henderson and State v. Lawson, 105 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (2015).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol105/iss4/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

6. KAPLAN FINAL TO PRINTER (UPDATED 12.8.2016)

12/8/2016 2:18 PM

0091-4169/15/10504-0947
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2016 by Aliza B. Kaplan & Janis C. Puracal

Vol. 105, No. 4
Printed in U.S.A.

WHO COULD IT BE NOW? CHALLENGING
THE RELIABILITY OF FIRST TIME INCOURT IDENTIFICATIONS AFTER STATE
V. HENDERSON AND STATE V. LAWSON
ALIZA B. KAPLAN* & JANIS C. PURACAL**
Despite the recent advances in assessing the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, the focus to date has largely been identifications made
pretrial. Little has been written about identifications made for the first time
in the courtroom. While in-court identifications have an extraordinarily
powerful effect on juries, all such identifications are potentially vulnerable
to post-event memory distortion and decay. Absent an identification
procedure that effectively tests the witness’s memory, it is impossible to know
if the witness’s identification of the defendant is a product of his or her
original memory or a product of the extraordinarily suggestive
circumstances created by the in-court identification procedure. In this
article, the authors discuss the science related to memory and perception and
how the courts have historically addressed claims of suggestiveness in the
context of eyewitness identifications and, specifically, how they have handled
first time in-court identifications. They analyze the issue of first time, in-court
identifications under the new legal frameworks established by the Oregon
Supreme Court in State v. Lawson (2012) and the New Jersey Supreme Court
in State v. Henderson (2011), which both recognize 30 years of science
proving that memories are malleable and easily influenced by outside forces.
They argue that, in all states, first time, in-court identifications should be
* Professor and Director, Criminal Justice Reform Clinic, Lewis & Clark Law School, CoFounder, Oregon Innocence Project. J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, B.A. The
George Washington University. Thank you to Lewis & Clark Law School Associate Dean of
Faculty and Professor of Law Susan Mandiberg for the great suggestions and student Erica
Hayne (JD ’16) for the terrific research assistance. And thank you G for your light, my parents
for your encouragement, and S, E, and M for your love.
** Co-Founder and Co-Chair, Oregon Innocence Project, and Of Counsel, Maloney
Lauersdorf Reiner PC. J.D., Seattle University School of Law, B.S., New York University.
Thank you to Reed College Professor of Psychology Daniel Reisberg for his expertise. And
thank you to my brother and sister, who are my lifelong friends, and to Andy, my partner and
champion.

947

6. KAPLAN FINAL TO PRINTER (UPDATED 12.8.2016)

948

KAPLAN & PURACAL

12/8/2016 2:18 PM

[Vol. 105

inadmissible, forcing the state to conduct a reliable out-of-court
identification, whether pretrial or with leave during trial.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979, a woman identified John Jerome White as the intruder who
broke into her home in Georgia and raped and robbed her while she was
asleep on the couch.1 After White served more than twelve years in prison
for rape, assault, burglary, and robbery, DNA evidence conclusively proved
that the victim identified the wrong man. The DNA proved that, not only was
White not the rapist, another man, James Parham, was the actual perpetrator.
The victim identified White even though Parham, the man who actually
1

John Jerome White, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content
/Johncases-false-imprisonment/john-jerome-white (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).

6. KAPLAN FINAL TO PRINTER (UPDATED 12.8.2016)

2015]

RELIABILITY OF FIRST TIME IN-COURT IDS

12/8/2016 2:18 PM

949

attacked her, was present in the live lineup.
In 1995, four victims identified Patrick Waller as the man who robbed
them, tied them up, and sexually assaulted one of them in an abandoned
house. 2 All four witnesses identified Waller at trial, and despite alibi
testimony, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. After serving
more than 15 years in prison, DNA evidence conclusively proved that Waller
did not commit the crime and another man, Byron Bell, was the real attacker.
The Dallas District Attorney’s Conviction Integrity Unit reviewed the case
and obtained confessions from Bell and his accomplice, Lemondo Simmons.
Waller was freed on July 3, 2008, after serving more than 15 years in prison
for a crime he did not commit.
Eyewitness misidentification is one of the leading causes of wrongful
convictions nationwide, playing a role in about 70% of convictions
overturned through DNA testing. 3 More than 30 years of social science
research has proven that eyewitness identification is often inaccurate and
unreliable.4 Despite its proven inaccuracy, eyewitness identification is still
used to target suspects in nearly 80,000 cases each year.5
Much has been written about eyewitness identification and wrongful
convictions.6 This article will focus on in-court identifications—specifically,
the use of first time, in-court stranger identifications where there was no
pretrial identification (e.g., lineup) 7 —and how the body of social science
2

Patrick Waller, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-falseimprisonment/patrick-waller (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).
3
Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org
/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); see also State v.
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 885 (N.J. 2011).
4
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 50 (2011) (“[E]yewitness testimony is among the least reliable
forms of evidence and yet persuasive to juries.”) (quoting Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness
Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUM.
BEHAV., 603, 605 (1998)).
5
Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (citing Alvin G. Goldstein et al.,
Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases: A Survey of Prosecutors, 27 BULL.
PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 71–74 (1989)).
6
See, e.g., Jules Epstein, Irreparable Misidentifications and Reliability: Reassessing the
Threshold for Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification, 58 VILL. L. REV. 69 (2013); Dana
Walsh, The Dangers of Eyewitness Identification: A Call for Greater State Involvement to
Ensure Fundamental Fairness, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1415 (2013).
7
As early as 1996, even without the benefit of the breadth of the scientific evidence
available today, Professor Evan Mandery argued for the per se exclusion of suggestive incourt identifications, finding “no basis in law or public policy to differentiate the treatment of
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research undermines the reliability of such identifications. In first time, incourt identifications, a witness is identifying the defendant for the first time
after he or she has already been identified by the state as the suspect and
charged with the crime. The defendant is isolated at the defense table and is
often the only person in the courtroom matching the perpetrator’s description.
As this article demonstrates, the courtroom is an inherently suggestive setting
for a stranger identification conducted for the first time, and such an
identification is particularly unreliable because the witness’s memory
inevitably decays or becomes distorted in the time between the incident and
the defendant’s trial.
We use as an example the case of Jerrin Hickman, an African-American
male who was convicted of murder in Oregon after two young white women
identified him for the first time in the courtroom at trial.8 The authors of this
article take no position on the merits of Hickman’s conviction, but raise the
case because the suggestiveness of the identifications casts a shadow of
uncertainty on the conviction, leaving the integrity of its resolution open to
debate—a result unsatisfying to prosecutors, defendants, and the courts.9
Hickman’s case began on New Year’s Eve 2007 when two young white
women (D and N) were present when Christopher Monette was shot during
a party in Northeast Portland, Oregon. 10 Police were called to investigate
Monette’s murder. Within hours of the shooting, D told the investigating
officer that “she didn’t see the shooting and really couldn’t describe much,”
and, as a result, she “could not give specific descriptions of who was
involved.”11 N could tell the officer only that the shooter was an AfricanAmerican man wearing a “do-rag,” who had a stocky build and was in his
mid-twenties.12 During the two years that passed between the night of the
shooting and Hickman’s trial, the state never conducted a lineup, photo array,
in-court identifications from pre-trial identifications.” Evan J. Mandery, Due Process
Considerations of In-Court Identifications, 60 ALB. L. REV. 389, 391–92 (1996).
8
State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 554–57 (Or. 2014).
9
See Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and the
Evaluation of Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613, 669–71 (2014) (discussing how the
increased visibility of wrongful convictions has created public pressure on prosecutors to
ensure the reliability of criminal convictions); Hon. Jonathan Lippman, Judiciary Examines
Causes of Wrongful Convictions: New York State Task Force Issues Report, 26 CRIM. JUST.,
Fall 2011, at 12 (“Every wrongful conviction is a stain on the reputation of the courts, eroding
public trust and confidence in the legitimacy of our institutional status and the fairness and
accuracy of our decisions.”).
10
See Hickman, 330 P.3d at 554–56.
11
Id. at 555.
12
Id. at 556.
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or any other pretrial identification procedure to discover whether the two
young women could identify Hickman or anyone else as the shooter.13
At trial, nearly two years after the shooting, D took the stand, saw
Hickman seated at the defense table, and testified that she was “95 percent
certain” that Hickman was the shooter.14 For the very first time, D provided
a detailed description of the shooter, which matched Hickman seated before
her.15 Also from the stand, N pointed to Hickman sitting at the defense table
and identified him as the shooter.16 Once again, for the first time in two years,
N gave details about the shooter’s appearance—all matching Hickman seated
in front of her.17 Hickman was convicted of Monette’s murder and sentenced
to life in prison based predominantly on these two first time, in-court stranger
identifications.18
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court19 ruled that the identifications in
Hickman were properly admitted under State v. Lawson,20 its 2012 landmark
decision requiring major changes to evaluating identification evidence.21 In
Lawson, the court changed the standard for admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence to reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions by
taking into account more than 30 years of scientific research on eyewitness
identification and memory. In doing so, the court rejected the balancing test
that had been in place22 and shifted the burden to the state to establish that
13

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 556–57.
17
Id.
18
The remainder of the state’s case included the testimony of one Porter, who was also
involved in an argument with the victim the night of the murder and was “for a time a suspect.”
State v. Hickman, 298 P.3d 619, 620 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). Several other eyewitnesses testified
that the perpetrator had a similar physical appearance to Hickman, but were unable to make a
positive identification because the perpetrator wore a ski mask. Hickman, 330 P.3d at 571. The
state also presented a ski mask found at the scene, on which testing revealed the DNA of both
Hickman and Porter. Hickman, 298 P.3d at 620.
19
Hickman, 330 P.3d 551.
20
291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012).
21
See Hickman, 330 P.3d at 556–59 (describing the framework for evaluating the
admissibility under Lawson, where the Oregon Supreme Court embraced the body of scientific
research focused on the reliability of eyewitness identifications).
22
The Lawson court rejected the test previously articulated in State v. Classen, 590 P.2d
1198 (Or. 1979), finding that the test was no longer adequate based on the “considerable
developments in both the law and the science [with regard to] eyewitness identification
evidence.” Lawson, 291 P.3d at 678. The Classen decision was grounded in Oregon’s
evidentiary code, but nevertheless adopted the due process analysis set forth in Manson v.
14
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eyewitness identification evidence is admissible by assessing its reliability
under the Oregon Evidence Code.23 The Hickman court failed to understand
how the science discussed and accepted in Lawson should apply to all
eyewitness identifications, not just those made pretrial.24
The Oregon Supreme Court, in Lawson, was the second state supreme
court to take a thoughtful and comprehensive approach to conforming the law
of eyewitness identification to the scientific consensus in order to reduce
misidentification, 25 the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions
nationwide.26 The New Jersey Supreme Court was the first state supreme
court to institute reform.
The unreliability of eyewitness evidence was set out in stark relief in
State v. Henderson, 27 where the New Jersey Supreme Court, through a
Special Master’s Report, examined 30 years of scientific research on the
reliability of eyewitness identification and memory.28 The Henderson Report
concluded that “[t]he scientific findings . . . are reliable, definitive and

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). Classen, 590 P.2d
at 1199; see also discussion of Manson/Biggers test in Part III.
23
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697 (“[T]he state, as the proponent of the eyewitness’ identification
must establish all preliminary facts necessary to establish admissibility of the eyewitness
evidence.”).
24
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony
of D and N, concluding that the variables embraced in Lawson “weigh[ed] heavily against
reliability,” particularly because the first time, in-court identification procedure was “similar
to, but significantly more suggestive than, a ‘show-up,’” and further, because the witness is
“always aware of whom police officers have targeted as a suspect,” and it is “obvious that the
state’s prosecutorial apparatus [confirmed those suspicions].” Hickman, 330 P.3d at 624
(citations omitted). The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing the in-court procedure
from suggestive pretrial procedure, and concluding that because the factfinder “can observe
the witness’s demeanor . . . during the identification process” and the identification is subject
to “immediate challenge through cross-examination,” assessment of the reliability of that
identification is the province of the jury. Hickman, 330 P.3d at 564.
25
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 685. (“[W]e believe that it is imperative that law enforcement, the
bench, and the bar be informed of the existence of current scientific research and literature
regarding the principles of accountability and fairness.”).
26
Out of 316 DNA exonerations to date, mistaken identifications played a role in 75
percent of those wrongful convictions. Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 3; see also
GARRETT, supra note 4, at 48 (noting that 76 percent of the first 250 convictions overturned
due to DNA evidence since 1989 involved eyewitness misidentification).
27
27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
28
Id. at 916. According to one of the testifying researchers, this report represented the
“gold standard in terms of the applicability of social science research to the law.”
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unquestionably fit for use in the courtroom.”29 Relying on these scientific
findings, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a breakthrough decision
requiring major changes in the way its courts evaluate identification evidence
at trial and instruct juries.30 The new framework instructs New Jersey courts
to greatly expand the factors that courts and juries should consider in
assessing the risk of misidentification, emphasizing, in particular, the ways
administrators can influence the outcome of identification procedures,31 the
inherently suggestive quality of “show-ups,” 32 how memory becomes
decayed and distorted within a short period of time,33 and the fact that juries
often overvalue the credibility of eyewitness testimony regardless of curative
instructions.34
In addition to the Lawson and Henderson decisions, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently convened a special committee to
study the science and law regarding eyewitness identifications and
recommended numerous changes to the law, including taking judicial notice
of the 30 years of science reviewed and accepted by the Henderson and
Lawson courts. 35 Even before the landmark decisions in Henderson and
Lawson, other state courts embraced the task of building upon the federal
floor and developing enhanced procedures grounded in state constitutions.36
It is likely that other jurisdictions will follow.
Despite the recent advances in assessing the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, the focus to date has largely been identifications made
pretrial.37 Little has been written about identifications made for the first time
29
SUPREME COURT OF N.J., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, STATE V. HENDERSON 73
(2008), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%20
BRIEF%20(00621142).PDF.
30
See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 927–29.
31
Id. at 896–902 (discussing blind administration, pre-identification instructions, lineup
construction, and other ways that government actors can increase the reliability of an
identification).
32
Id. at 902–03. A show-up is a procedure where police officers present an eyewitness
with a single suspect for identification.
33
Id. at 907.
34
Id. at 910–12 (“[J]urors do not evaluate eyewitness memory in a manner consistent with
psychological theory and findings.”) (quoting Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 190 (1990)).
35
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GRP: ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JUSTICES (2013) at 59, http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/
eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf.
36
See infra Section III.C.
37
Both the Henderson and Lawson methodologies presuppose the performance of a
pretrial identification, since otherwise, the defense would likely not have sufficient knowledge
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in the courtroom, like those made in the case of Jerrin Hickman described
above.
Five months after Hickman was decided in Oregon and during the
authorship of this article, the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts
decided Commonwealth v. Crayton,38 in which the court excluded a similar
first time, in-court identification. The Crayton court in Massachusetts
specifically took issue with the reasoning of the Hickman court in Oregon
and sharply disagreed with the basis of the Hickman ruling.39
Earlier in 2014, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) published
an insightful and much-anticipated report on assessing eyewitness
identifications. The NAS properly recommended that “[a]n identification of
the kind dealt with in this report typically should not occur for the first time
in the courtroom.”40 Neither Crayton nor the NAS report, however, discusses
in detail the science undermining the reliability of first time, in-court
identifications.
As discussed below, a first time, in-court identification is inherently
suggestive because the defendant has already been identified by the state as
the suspect and charged with the crime. The witness is well aware that the
individual seated at the defense table is not only a suspect, but is also the
suspect and the only one on trial. In Hickman, the first time, in-court
identification also took place more than two years after the incident occurred
and involved a cross-racial identification where the defendant was the only
black man in the well of the courtroom. 41 The factors in Hickman are of
concern in any identification.
Unfortunately, the Hickman court failed to truly appreciate the
suggestiveness of outside factors at play in the first time, in-court
identifications. Rather than apply the accepted science, 42 the Oregon
Supreme Court mistakenly believed that prejudice from suggestion can be
“cured” through cross examination by defense counsel, a jury’s presence
during the in-court identification, and a trial judge’s evaluation.43 The belief
of the relevant factors affecting the reliability of the identification needed to challenge its
admission. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919–22; State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 690–97 (Or.
2012).
38
21 N.E.3d 157 (Mass. 2014).
39
Id. at 168–70.
40
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT:
ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 110 (2014).
41
State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 557–58 (Or. 2014).
42
See infra Part II for discussion of the science.
43
Hickman, 330 P.3d at 564.
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that suggestion can be “cured” is misplaced based on what we have learned
from the more than 500 wrongful convictions around the country involving
mistaken eyewitness identifications44 and the 30 years of science that has
dramatically changed our understanding of the human memory.
While in-court identifications have an extraordinarily powerful effect on
juries, all such identifications are potentially vulnerable to post-event
memory distortion and decay. In fact, the factors that lead psychologists and
scholars (and now a few courts) to question the ability of jurors to assess the
reliability of pretrial identifications are present in their purest forms in a first
time, in-court identification. 45 Absent an identification procedure that
effectively tests the witness’s memory, 46 it is impossible to know if the
witness’s identification of the defendant is a product of his or her original
memory or a product of the extraordinarily suggestive circumstances created
by the in-court identification procedure. In such in-court identifications, the
risk of misidentification is heightened by suggestive circumstances that are
no different than “show-ups,”47 (a procedure where police officers present an
eyewitness with a single suspect for identification), which have been
condemned by science and courts.48
44
See THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx# (Last visited May 31, 2015);
see also Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications,
and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 774–83 (2007) (describing
how cross-examination fails to undercut the reliability of an identification, even when
addressing factors known to undermine the reliability of an identification, such as cross-racial
identifications, the presence of a weapon during the crime, and memory decay).
45
See the discussion regarding the science and factors that affect reliability, infra Part II.
46
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896–98 (N.J. 2011) (discussing means to
effectively test an eyewitness’s memory, including advising the witness that the suspect may
not be present in the lineup, presenting a lineup made up of look-alikes with a minimum
number of fillers, and preventing the witness from viewing one suspect in multiple
identification procedures).
47
Show-ups are identification procedures where only one person is presented to the
eyewitness “to see if [the witness] will identify that person as the perpetrator.” Jessica Lee,
Note, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects from the Consequences of NonExigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 755, 797 (2005) (arguing that non-exigent
show-ups should never be permissible, even with the suspect’s consent). See generally Amy
Luria, Showup Identifications: A Comprehensive Overview of the Problems and a Discussion
of Necessary Changes, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 515 (2008) (recommending restricting when the police
may conduct show-ups, restricting the procedures police officers may use during show-ups,
and heightening the admissibility requirements for show-up identifications).
48
As early as 1967, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the “practice of showing
suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has
been widely condemned.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (citation omitted); see
also Henderson, 27 A.3d at 903 (“[T]he main problem with showups is that . . . they fail to
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In this article, we recognize the possibility that, as more states around
the country require more reliable, science-based pretrial identification
procedures through case law or policy changes, police and prosecutors may
opt for first time, in-court identifications when the witness is equivocal and
the courtroom setting inures to the benefit of the state. It is our contention
that these identifications should be held inadmissible to encourage police and
prosecutors to conduct reliable out-of-court identifications, whether pretrial
or with leave during trial. As courts begin to accept the vast amount of science
indicating how eyewitness perception and memory truly work, there is no
principled basis for limiting the application of the science to pretrial
identifications and carving out exceptions for in-court identifications. The
same issues of perception and memory are at play in both settings. Now is
the time to scrutinize the practice of first time, in-court stranger
identifications especially in light of the contrary holdings in Hickman and
Crayton.49
In Part II, we set forth the basic science related to memory and
perception and how it applies to first time, in-court identifications. In Part III,
we discuss how courts have historically addressed claims of suggestiveness
in the context of eyewitness identifications and, specifically, how they have
handled in-court identifications including first time stranger identifications.
And in Part IV, we analyze first time, in-court identifications under the
scientific framework as articulated and accepted by the Oregon Supreme
Court in Lawson and the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henderson, both of
which recognize 30 years of science that proves that our memories are easily
influenced by factors beyond our control and, often, beyond our perception.
II. SCIENCE50
While scientists have been studying memory and eyewitness
identification for more than 100 years, social and cognitive psychologists
began conducting and publishing programmatic memory research in the
provide a safeguard against witnesses with poor memories or those inclined to guess, because
every mistaken identification in a showup will point to the suspect.”); State v. Lawson, 291
P.3d 673, 686 (Or. 2012) (“Police showups are generally regarded as inherently suggestive . . .
because the witness is always aware of whom police officers have targeted as a suspect.”).
49
This article focuses strictly on first time, in-court identifications. For helpful information
about in-court identifications following a suggestive pretrial identification, see generally
Brandon Garrett, Eyewitness and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451 (2012).
50
This Part provides a brief overview of some of the significant scientific concepts related
to eyewitness identification. For further information about the science, see generally
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F.
Loftus eds., 1984).
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1970s.51 Since then, however, much has been discovered about how memory
and perception actually work, and most significantly, research has
demonstrated that memory is far more complex than previously thought.
Studies have found that memory is inherently unstable and subject to
change52 and that the human mind is not at all like a tape recorder—it neither
records nor recalls events exactly as seen.53
A. HUMAN MEMORY IS A RECONSTRUCTION

Frederic Bartlett, the first scientist to conduct research on reconstructive
memory, found that in order to make sense of an event we go through a
process called “effort after meaning.”54 Instead of storing an exact replica of
the event, we combine our perceptions with elements of existing knowledge
and experience to form a reconstructive memory. 55 That reconstruction (or,
initially, construction) can occur in any of the three stages conventionally
used to describe the sequence of remembering: A person perceives the event
(acquisition stage); then, after time passes, attempts to remember the
event/information (retention stage); and finally, tries to recall the event/stored
information (the retrieval stage). 56 At each of these three stages, multiple
51
See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification
Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years
Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 5 (2009) (discussing the development of eyewitness
identification science).
52
Once created, memories are not fixed, contrary to the popular conception that memories
are “permanent imprints that might fade but are otherwise stable.” MEMORY AND LAW 5 (Lynn
Nadel & Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2012). Research has demonstrated that “stable
memories can be altered when they are reactivated,” and “memory is fundamentally
malleable.” Id. “The most important implication is that when memories are replayed, as when
either a victim or a witness is being questioned by investigators, or giving testimony in the
courtroom, or even discussing events with others, this process of reactivating and replaying
memory inalterably changes it going forward.” Id.
53
“The act of remembering, says eminent memory researcher Professor Elizabeth F.
Loftus of the University of California, Irvine, is “more akin to putting puzzle pieces together
than retrieving a video recording.” Hal Arkowitz & Scott O. Lillienfeld, Do The “Eyes” Have
It?, SCI. AM. MIND Jan./Feb. 2010, at 68–69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54
FREDERIC C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 44 (2d ed. 1995). Bartlett’s study reveals that individuals bring their own “native
or acquired temperament, bias and interests” into situations requiring perception and memory,
and they utilize those individual tendencies “so as to make [their] reaction the ‘easiest,’ or the
least disagreeable, or the quickest and least obstructed that is at the time possible.”
55
Id. at 213 (“Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and
fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out of the relation
of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organized past reactions or experience . . . .”).
56
See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 12–13
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factors can impact and alter a person’s memory.57 As a result, information
passing through the memory process can be distorted.58 And all three stages
can be affected by personal perception, which is a “highly selective” process
dependent upon both psychological factors, including “experience, learning,
preferences, biases, and expectations,” and physical senses.59
Scientists have demonstrated that the manner in which a perceived event
is logged in a witness’s mind may be influenced by the expectations of that
witness.60 Because the mind can only process a certain amount of incoming
information at one time, perception is extremely selective.61 This means that
the mind filters out information that is less focused.62 For example, in the
acquisition stage, factors such as lighting, stress, and duration of the event all
come into play.63 In the retention stage, factors such as normal forgetfulness,
the passage of time, and the receipt of new information after the event all
influence a person’s memory. 64 And finally, in the retrieval stage,
questioning used to elicit information has been found to have a serious impact
on a person’s memory.65 Using this accepted model and conducting hundreds
of studies, social scientists have reached a consensus on certain factors that
impact the ability of eyewitnesses to perceive and remember events
accurately.66

(4th ed. 2007).
57
Id. at 13.
58
See A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 3 (1979) (citing
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 22 (1979)); Cindy J. O’Hagan, Note, When
Seeing is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 745
(1993).
59
Fradella, supra note 5, at 5 (citing Robert Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness
Identification, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 75, 76 (1976); Frederick E. Chemay, Unreliable
Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L.
REV. 721, 724 (1985) (citation omitted)).
60
See Fradella, supra note 5, at 7.
61
Id. at 5.
62
Id. at 5–6.
63
LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 56, at 13, 16–19, 29.
64
Id. at 53–54, 58–59.
65
Id. at 13, 70–71.
66
See Saul Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony
Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 413–14 (2001) (revealing
a strong consensus among experts regarding the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness
testimony, which include “the wording of questions, lineup instructions, postevent information
biases, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, the accuracy-confidence
correlation, weapon focus, the forgetting curve, exposure time, and unconscious
transference”).
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According to Professors of Psychology Elizabeth Loftus and Gary
Wells, to truly understand eyewitness identification in the criminal justice
context and the reconstruction that occurs when a witness recalls a past event,
it is important to know that when a witness recalls a past event, specific
memory traces are encoded.67 Memory traces can be likened to other forms
of evidence such as physical trace evidence like blood or fingerprints.68 And
“[l]ike physical evidence, memory trace evidence can be contaminated, lost,
destroyed, or otherwise made to produce results that can lead to an incorrect
reconstruction of the event in question.”69
B. MEMORY IS LESS RELIABLE OVER TIME

Research has confirmed that testimony can become more unreliable
with the passage of time, as the brain attempts to put certainty into a
recollection that at times has been uncertain.
The passage of time seems an obvious consideration when
reconstructing a memory. What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that
memory loss occurs shortly after the initial observation, sometimes even
within minutes or hours.70 Studies indicate that faces are often forgotten only
a few hours after an event, and that after one day, the recall of a “strangers’
age, hair color, and height [is] usually inaccurate.”71 As a result, the passage
of time between the event and the identification can seriously undermine the
accuracy of an identification.
It is also important to understand that “[m]emories don’t just fade,” but

67
Elizabeth F. Loftus & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events, in 11
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 617 (R.K. Otto and & I.B. Weiner eds., 2013) (“[A] criminal
event involving an eyewitness leaves a trace in the brain of the eyewitness.”).
68
Id.
69
See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 688 (Or. 2012) (“Memory generally decays over
time. Decay rates are exponential rather than linear, with the greatest proportion of memory
loss occurring shortly after an initial observation, then leveling off over time.”); see also
Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Forgetting the Once-Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of
an Eyewitness’s Memory Representation, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 139, 148
(2008) (“[The r]ate of memory loss for an unfamiliar face is greatest right after the encounter
and then levels off over time.”).
70
Id.
71
Lee, supra note 47, at 771 (citing A. DANIEL YARMEY, UNDERSTANDING POLICE AND
POLICE WORK: PSYCHOSOCIAL ISSUES 299 (1990)). “If the showups were delayed, however, by
just two hours, more than half the witnesses mistakenly ‘identified’ someone in a showup,
compared to a rate of only 14% false identification with (target-absent) photo lineups.” DANIEL
REISBERG, THE SCIENCE OF PERCEPTION AND MEMORY: A PRAGMATIC GUIDE FOR THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 122–23 (2014) (citations omitted).
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with time, “they also grow.”72 What actually fades “is the initial perception,
the actual experience of the events . . . and with each recollection the memory
may be changed—colored by succeeding events, other people’s recollections
or suggestions, increased understanding, or a new context.” 73 Thus, the
realities of a past event, “when seen through the filter of our memories, are
not objective facts but subjective, interpretive realities,” and “[w]e interpret
the past, correcting ourselves, adding bits and pieces, deleting
uncomplimentary or disturbing recollections, sweeping, dusting, tidying
things up.”74
By the time a memory is reconstructed (at the time of the identification),
the witness has often unconsciously filled in his vague recollections with the
image of the person in the lineup, in a photograph, or seated at the defense
table. For example, research has shown that the high stress that may
accompany witnessing a crime may cause the witness to focus on elements
that we perceive as posing the greatest risk or danger (e.g., the weapon),
causing the witness to divert his attention from other details, such as the
identifying characteristics of the perpetrator.75 If a witness later sees a picture
of the accused on television or in the newspaper, the witness may use those
details to erroneously fill in details that were missed during the actual
encounter. 76 Once that erroneous information is stored in memory, the
witness will not be able to distinguish between his actual perceptions and
those constructed after the fact. 77 Furthermore, over time, as the witness
continues to think about the (erroneous) details, he can become even more
confident in his misidentification.78
Not only can memories be erroneously distorted in the time after the
event, but “memories can [also] be altered when they are reactivated.” 79
Professor Loftus’s numerous studies (beginning in the 1970s) about how
people are affected by post-event misinformation indicate that when
misleading information is incorporated into a person’s memory after an

72

ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE
ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL 20 (1991).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Memories of crime scene witnesses can focus on the weapon at the expense of peripheral
details, such as clothing of an accomplice. Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review
of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 414 (1992).
76
See Fradella, supra note 5, at 8.
77
Id. at 8–9.
78
Id. at 21.
79 NADEL & SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, supra note 52.
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event, memory can change and lead to inaccuracies at recall. 80 This
phenomenon is called “the misinformation effect.”81 Over the last 30 years,
numerous scientific studies have corroborated and extended these findings.82
Misinformation effects have been demonstrated in people of all ages and after
different types of events.83 Research studies have used diverse methods of
delivering the misinformation and assessing memory of the witnessed
event.84
Research has shown that memory can be altered as it is reactivated and
replayed, such as when the victim or a witness is being questioned by
investigators, or giving testimony in the courtroom, or even when discussing
events with others. 85 For example, when being questioned by law
enforcement or in court, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the
questioner may give a witness subtle cues as to the correct suspect. 86 In
response to these cues, the witness may alter his testimony because fragments
80
See, e.g., Bi Zhu, et al., Individual Differences in False Memory from Misinformation:
Cognitive Factors, 18 MEMORY 543 (2010) (suggesting that people with relatively low
intelligence and poor perceptual abilities might be more susceptible to the misinformation
effect); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Make-Believe Memories, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 867 (2003)
[hereinafter Make-Believe Memories] (indicating that postevent suggestion can contaminate
what a person remembers); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Hunter G. Hoffman, Misinformation and
Memory: The Creation of New Memories, 118 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 100 (1989)
(indicating that misleading information presented after an event can lead people to erroneous
reports of that misinformation).
81
See Loftus & Hoffman, supra note 80, at 100.
82
See Maria S. Zaragoza et al., Misinformation Effect and the Suggestibility of
Eyewitness Memory, DO JUSTICE AND LET THE SKY FALL 35, 36 (2006), available at http://
www.personal.kent.edu/~mzaragoz/publications/Zaragoza%20chapter%204%20Garry%20
Hayne.pdf.
83
See, e.g., Uta Jaschinski & Dirk Wentura, Misleading Postevent Information and
Working Memory Capacity: An Individual Differences Approach to Eyewitness Memory, 16
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 223 (2002) (examining how individual differences in working
memory capacity relate to the effect of misleading postevent information on memory for the
original event); Henry Roediger & Lisa Geraci, Aging and the Misinformation Effect: A
Neuropsychological Analysis, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 321 (2007) (showing that older
adults are more susceptible to the deleterious effect of misinformation than are younger adults
and that their increased susceptibility is mediated by their neuropsychological functioning).
84
See Loftus, Make-Believe Memories, supra note 80 at 546 (discussing the variety of
scientific research addressing the “misinformation effect”).
85
NADEL & SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, supra note 52.
86
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d, 872, 896 (N.J. 2011) (discussing how a non-blind
administrator can sway an eyewitness to identify a suspect with as little as “innocuous words
and subtle cues—pauses, gestures, hesitations, or smiles”) (citing Ryann M. Haw & Ronald
P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1107 (2004)).

6. KAPLAN FINAL TO PRINTER (UPDATED 12.8.2016)

962

KAPLAN & PURACAL

12/8/2016 2:18 PM

[Vol. 105

of his memory may unknowingly combine with information provided by the
questioner.87 This leads to inaccurate recall and skewed testimony. Thus, the
“retrieval processes are crucial,” since witnesses “usually take the traces of
experience and weave them together into a more or less coherent description
of a remembered event, a description that depends heavily on the cues used
during retrieval.”88
C. WITNESS CONFIDENCE IS HIGHLY MALLEABLE

Not only is an eyewitness’s memory of a crime highly malleable and
subject to change, but so is an eyewitness’s confidence in the accuracy of his
memory of the crime.89 Because so much of the memory process takes place
on an unconscious level, by the time an identification occurs, a witness may
feel completely confident and truly believe that a mistaken identification is
accurate.90 The lack of a connection between accuracy and confidence in an
eyewitness is “one of the most consistent findings in the memory research
literature.”91 The majority of studies find a weak or nonexistent link between
an eyewitness’s subjective level of confidence and the accuracy of his
memory.92 One meta-analysis of thirty-five eyewitness identification studies
found that confident eyewitnesses were only “somewhat more accurate” than
non-confident eyewitnesses. 93 While there are numerous factors that can

87
See Henry L. Roediger III et al., The Curious Complexity Between Confidence and
Accuracy in Reports from Memory, in MEMORY AND LAW 91 (Lynn Nadel & Walter P.
Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2012) (describing how “retrieval cues” determine whether or not an
event is retrieved from memory).
88
Id.
89
See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 624 (1998) (“Confidence
malleability refers to the tendency for an eyewitness to become more (or less) confident in his
or her identification as a function of events that occur after the identification.”).
90
See C. A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence:
Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714, 720 (1994)
(demonstrating how eyewitness confidence “can be dramatically inflated and deflated
independently” of “the extent that the identified person seems perceptually familiar or matches
the eyewitness’s memory particularly well”).
91
Kevin Krug, The Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy: Current Thoughts of
the Literature and a New Area of Research, 3 APPLIED PSYCHOL. CRIM. JUST. 7, 31 (2007).
92
See id. But see Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in
Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 475, 486 (2001) (“The
relationship between confidence and suspect/foil identification for the live lineups is a solid
one.”).
93
Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating
Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 338, 349 (1997).
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increase eyewitness confidence, including confirming feedback from police
and prosecutors, they do not in any way improve the accuracy of an
eyewitness’s identification. 94 Furthermore, an eyewitness is generally
unaware that his confidence has been increased by these factors.95 Professors
Michael Leippe and Donna Eisenstadt explain that “confidence statements
made following an immediate post-identification confidence judgment will
inevitably be hopelessly undiagnostic of memory accuracy. Short of being
restricted to a hermetically sealed room until the trial, it is hard to imagine an
eyewitness not being subjected to manipulative influences on his or her
confidence.”96
In response to concerns that the psychological research into eyewitness
memory was not applicable to the justice system, Professor Gary Wells
categorized all the variables that can affect a person’s memory of an event
into either “estimator” or “system” variables.97 Estimator variables are those
that affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, but cannot be
controlled by the criminal justice system. 98 These might include such
variables as the lighting when the crime took place or the distance of the
witness from the perpetrator during the crime. 99 Estimator variables also
include more complex factors, including race (identifications have proven to
be less accurate when witnesses are identifying perpetrators of a different
race), the presence of a weapon during a crime, and the degree of stress or

94

See Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, Eyewitness Confidence and the
Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Memory for People, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY, MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 377, 417–18 (Rod C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2007).
95
See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback
to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
360, 373 (1998).
96
See Leippe & Eisenstadt, supra note 94, at 417–18.
97
Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research: System Variables and
Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1548 (1978) (describing the
“criminal justice implications” of memory science); see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d, 872,
895–96 (N.J. 2011) (discussing the difference between system and estimator variables); State
v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 685–88 (Or. 2012) (same). Professor Wells also framed his research
by stating, “[T]he goal of applied eyewitness testimony research is to generate scientific
knowledge that will maximize the chances that a guilty defendant will be justly convicted
while minimizing the chances that an innocent defendant will be mistakenly convicted.”
Wells, supra, at 1546.
98
Wells, supra note 97, at 1548 (explaining that estimator variables are so characterized
because “in actual crimes, one can at best only estimate the role of such factors”) (emphasis
added).
99
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 687.
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trauma a witness experienced when seeing the perpetrator. 100 System
variables are those variables that the criminal justice system can control and
tend to come into play during the retrieval process.101 System variables can
have a strong impact on the probative value of eyewitness testimony, whether
the procedure used is a lineup, photo array, witness interview, or other
identification process.102
In light of the scientific community’s consolidation of the variables that
affect eyewitness memory, the U.S. Department of Justice incorporated these
variables into a manual for law enforcement with recommendations for
collecting eyewitness evidence. 103 These recommendations describe
safeguards that law enforcement can implement to protect memory evidence
and increase the likelihood of an accurate identification. 104 As discussed
above, the highest courts of New Jersey and Oregon have embraced the
usefulness of system and estimator variables in assessing the reliability of
eyewitness evidence. Despite the increased acceptance of memory science
within the criminal justice system, most courts continue to cling to the idea
that in-court identifications are different. These courts maintain that the
reliability of a first time, in-court identification is effectively tested through
cross-examination and jury assessment, relying on outdated understandings
of juror comprehension and ignoring the inherently suggestive atmosphere of
the courtroom.
III. STATE OF THE LAW: IN-COURT EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
The problem with first time, in-court identifications is that no one—not
the jury, not the court, and not the parties themselves—can tell whether the
100

Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL.
SCI. PUB. INT. 45, 52–53 (2006).
101
Id. at 47–48.
102
Id. at 46.
103
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NCJ 178240, EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999) [hereinafter GUIDE],
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, NCJ 188678, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT (2003), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf.
Researchers involved in the working group that produced these guides also published an
academic paper that describes the theoretical basis for these recommendations. See Wells et
al., supra note 4, at 9–10.
104
The Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, in developing these guides,
describes its objectives as including “[h]eighten[ing] the validity/accuracy of eyewitness
evidence as police, prosecutors, and other criminal justice professionals work with witnesses
to identify suspects,” and “[i]mprov[ing] the criminal justice system’s ability to evaluate the
strength and accuracy of eyewitness evidence.” GUIDE, supra note 103, at 4.
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in-court identification is a product of the courtroom setting (where the
defendant is seated at the defense table and the witness is aware that the state
believes him to be guilty) or is an independent memory that has not been
tainted.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long struggled with the admission of
identification testimony when that testimony may be contaminated by outside
factors. 105 The Court first raised serious concerns about eyewitness
identification evidence in the late 1960s, and, in response, created a per se
exclusionary rule to prevent the admission of identifications that take place
after the start of formal proceedings if the defendant is physically present and
denied the right to counsel. 106 That test became largely immaterial as the
police and prosecutors moved toward identification procedures that do not
require the presence of the defendant, like photographic arrays.
The Court later opened the door for defendants to challenge an
identification under due process if it is “so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”107
That test, however, was later diluted to the point that even identifications
contaminated by suggestion may be deemed nonetheless reliable.108
Thirty years of social science has since undermined the Supreme Court’s
standard, but the Court has refused to take the reins on bringing the law on
eyewitness identification in line with the prevailing scientific research

105
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“[T]he confrontation compelled
by the State between the accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification
evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might
seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial. The vagaries of eyewitness identification
are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: ‘What is the worth of identification testimony even when
uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of
such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English
and American trials.’”).
106 Id. at 235–40.
107
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); see Foster v. California, 394 U.S.
440, 442–43 (1969) (holding that, within the totality of the circumstances, the identification
procedure was “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification as to be a denial of due process of law”) (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 302 (1967)).
108
See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972) (upholding the admission of
eyewitness testimony subjected to suggestive procedures even where seven months passed
between the crime and confrontation, with the Court finding “no substantial likelihood of
misidentification”); Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (holding that the
admission of unreliable eyewitness evidence does not offend due process, so long as the
identification lacks the “taint of improper state conduct”).
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findings. Instead, it has left the task up to the state courts.109 A select few
states have risen to the challenge, rejecting the Supreme Court’s inadequate
test and opting for a standard guided by the real experts, the scientists. 110
Today, these states that have led the way to reform eyewitness identification
procedures are in prime position to keep moving the ball forward by
addressing first time, in-court identifications. The discussion below explores
the state of the law and the reasons why the current standard for eyewitness
identification evidence is inadequate, especially in assessing first time, incourt identifications.
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZED CONCERNS ABOUT
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS IN CREATING A SHORT-LIVED,
PER SE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Until 1967, courts throughout the United States took the position that
suggestiveness in pretrial identification procedures affects only the weight
and not the admissibility of a subsequent in-court identification.111 The Court
departed from that rule in 1967 when it decided United States v. Wade and
Gilbert v. California on the same day. 112 In Wade and Gilbert, the Court
ruled, for the first time, that eyewitness evidence could be categorically
excluded.113 In both of the cases, the witnesses had identified the defendants
at post-indictment lineups conducted without notice to, and in the absence of,

109
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728–29 (expressing “unwillingness to enlarge the domain of due
process,” while pointing to the presence of safeguards outside of the Constitution, such as
enhanced eyewitness jury instructions adopted by states, state rules regarding the admissibility
of evidence, and the presentation of expert testimony as permitted under state law).
110
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011) (“[The federal test] does not offer an
adequate measure for reliability or sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct. It also
overstates the jury’s inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by eyewitnesses who
honestly believe their testimony is accurate.”); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 688 (Or. 2012)
(describing the reliability factors embraced in previous state precedent, which are grounded in
the Supreme Court’s factor test, as “both incomplete and, at times, inconsistent with modern
scientific findings”).
111
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 382–83 (1968); see e.g., People v. Crenshaw, 155 N.E.2d 599,
604 (Ill. 1959) (“[T]he circumstances [surrounding the identification procedure] would not
completely impair and destroy the evidence of identification, but would only affect its weight
and credibility.”).
112
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
272 (1967).
113
In both cases, the Court held eyewitness testimony that is the product of a constitutional
violation must be categorically excluded in order to properly deter official misconduct and
preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Wade, 388 U.S. at 235–40; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272–
75.

6. KAPLAN FINAL TO PRINTER (UPDATED 12.8.2016)

2015]

RELIABILITY OF FIRST TIME IN-COURT IDS

12/8/2016 2:18 PM

967

the defendants’ counsel.114 The Court ruled that the defendants were entitled
to counsel at the pretrial lineups to prevent unfairness in the lineups and
assure effective cross-examination at trial.115 Because the defendants were
denied their absolute right to counsel at the lineups, those lineups were
deemed improper and the results excluded.116
The Court also recognized that the unlawful pretrial identification can
potentially affect the admissibility of the later in-court identification.117 The
Court stated that in-court identifications after the illegal lineup were
admissible only if “the in-court identifications were based upon observations
of the suspect other than the lineup identification.”118 That is, the in-court
identification must have an “independent origin.” 119 The test involved
consideration of the witness’s prior opportunity to observe the alleged
criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup
description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification of
another person prior to lineup, the identification by picture of the defendant
prior to lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the
lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification.120
The Wade Court’s recognition that “[s]uggestion can be created
intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways,” 121 is striking for its
time. Wade was decided long before the development (and acceptance) of
social scientists’ recognition of the impact of suggestion on eyewitness
testimony. Yet, the Wade Court remarked that “the influence of improper
suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more
miscarriages of justice than any other single factor—perhaps it is responsible
for more such errors than all other factors combined.” 122 The Court
recognized as “suggestive” a number of procedures, including where “the
witness is told by the police that they have caught the culprit after which the
114

Wade, 388 U.S. at 219–20; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 269–70.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 230–31.
116
Id. at 237; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272.
117
In Wade, the court refused to adopt a per se rule of exclusion of an in-court
identification following an unconstitutional identification procedure, but recognized that the
exclusion of only the testimony regarding the lineup itself would “render the right to counsel
an empty one,” since a pretrial identification serves to “crystallize” a witness’s identification
and cause his testimony to appear “unequivocal.” Wade, 388 U.S. at 240–42.
118
Id. at 240.
119
Id. at 242.
120
Id. at 241.
121
Id. at 229.
122
Id. at 218 (citing PATRICK M. WALL & C. C. THOMAS, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION
IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965)).
115
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defendant is brought before the witness alone or is viewed in jail[.]”123 The
Court noted, “It is hard to imagine a situation more clearly conveying the
suggestion to the witness that the one presented is believed guilty by the
police.”124
This situation, found suggestive by the Supreme Court, is remarkably
similar to the first time, in-court identification procedure—when the witness
is told by the prosecutor that the police have caught the culprit and then sees
the defendant for the first time inside the courtroom, seated at the defense
table having been charged with the crime. The witness is acutely aware that
the police and the prosecution believe the one presented is guilty. The Wade
Court was clear in its opinion that, in the pretrial context, the likelihood is
high that the witness’s identification will be influenced by the suggestion of
guilt.125
The Wade/Gilbert per se exclusionary rule indicates that the Court was
on the right track and understood, even without scientific support, that
identifications may be tainted by suggestion to such a degree as to preclude
admissibility. The Wade Court’s per se exclusionary rule prevents the
admission of identifications made without counsel in order to prevent
unnecessary and suggestive procedures. Meanwhile, the “independent
origin” test focuses on the ways in which the witness’s memory was tested
before the illegal pretrial identification tainted his memory. That is, the
“independent origin” test recognizes that an in-court identification may have
been contaminated by outside forces. 126 If there is the possibility of
contamination by an unreliable pretrial identification, the court must ask:
Was the witness’s memory tested before the illegal pretrial identification
such that the in-court identification can be proved to be reliable by
comparison?127
Although the Court acknowledged the effect that a suggestive pretrial
identification may have on a subsequent in-court identification, the Court did
not address the suggestiveness that inherently exists inside the courtroom.
The Wade/Gilbert rulings were eventually limited to their facts. In
123

Id. at 233.
Id. at 234.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 240 (“A rule limited solely to the exclusion of testimony concerning identification
at the lineup itself, without regard to admissibility of the courtroom identification, would
render the right to counsel an empty one. The lineup is most often used, as in the present case,
to crystallize the witnesses’ identification of the defendant for future reference. We have
already noted that the lineup identification will have that effect.”).
127
See id. at 241.
124
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United States v. Ash, the Court ruled that Wade/Gilbert applies only to the
defendant’s challenge of an in-court identification when the defendant has
been denied counsel at a prior post-indictment lineup.128 Despite the Wade
Court’s concerns that the defendant be assured the presence of counsel at a
post-indictment lineup, there is no right to the presence of counsel at
identification procedures that do not require or include the presence of the
accused (e.g., photospreads).129 Thus, the Wade/Gilbert rule rarely applies
today as the majority of pretrial identifications are now done through some
form of photo array or before formal charges when the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not apply.130
On the same day it decided Wade/Gilbert, the Supreme Court also
decided Stovall v. Denno, in which the Court, for the first time, analyzed
identification evidence under a due process analysis. 131 In Stovall, police
officers presented the defendant Stovall in handcuffs to the victim two days
after the crime, while she was recovering in the hospital.132 There was no
notice given to Stovall’s attorney.133 Stovall was the only suspect presented
to the victim and the only black man in the room at the time of the
identification.134 Police officers repeatedly asked the victim if Stovall “was
the man.”135 Stovall was convicted based on the identification and sentenced
to death.136 The Court held that such a “show up” may be challenged under a
due process analysis that “depends on the totality of the circumstances
surrounding it[.]”137 The Court recognized that “[t]he practice of showing
suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identifying the suspect, and not
as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.”138 The Court, however, held
the identification admissible because the victim might not have survived and
she was the only witness capable of exonerating the suspect, making the
show-up “imperative.”139 The Court put the recognized suggestiveness aside

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973).
Id.
Garrett, supra note 4, at 50 (citing Wells, supra note 4, at 608).
388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967).
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.
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and instead focused on the need for evidence that would otherwise be lost.140
The Court’s condemnation for show-ups, however, was clear. That
condemnation should apply with just as much force to first time, in-court
identifications where the defendant is singled out in the courtroom and is
already on trial for the crime. It is rarely, if ever, necessary to conduct a first
time, in-court identification, making the Stovall Court’s “need for the
evidence” analysis inapposite.
Only a few times in its history has the Court found an identification
procedure sufficiently suggestive to violate due process. For example, in
Foster v. California, the Court found a due process violation on
suggestiveness grounds where there were three different identification
procedures.141 During the first procedure, a suggestive lineup, the witness
failed to identify the suspect.142 During the second, a one man “show-up,” the
witness could only make a tentative identification.143 Undeterred, the police
arranged another lineup at which the witness finally was able to identify the
suspect.144 The Court found that the procedure “made it all but inevitable that
[the witness] would identify [the defendant] whether or not he was in fact
‘the man.’”145 That is, “[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness,
‘This is the man.’”146
While the Supreme Court itself has never addressed the issue of first
time, in-court identifications directly, its past recognition of “suggestiveness”
in Wade, Stovall, and Foster makes it difficult to comprehend how such
identifications have withstood challenge. The explanation, it seems, is that
the Court has diluted its standard over time to create a test under which even
suggestive identifications are deemed reliable and admissible because they
do not rise to the Court’s level of being “unnecessarily suggestive,” as
discussed below.147 Furthermore, the Court erroneously maintains that crossexamination is an effective tool for undermining an unreliable eyewitness
identification and overestimates the ability of jurors to distinguish between
confidence that is the product of suggestive circumstances and confidence
that actually signifies accuracy.148
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969).
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id. at 441–42.
Id. at 443.
Id.
See infra Section III.B.
See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 732 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
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B. JUST FIVE YEARS AFTER WADE/GILBERT, THE SUPREME COURT
DILUTED ITS OWN STANDARD BY MOVING TO A “TOTALITY OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES” TEST THAT IS WOEFULLY INADEQUATE

Any door that Stovall opened to challenge an identification under due
process has since been effectively closed. Furthermore, over the years, the
Court has whittled away at due process so that even a suggestive
identification procedure can be found reliable.149 The first major dilution of
the ruling was in 1972 in Neil v. Biggers, when the U.S. Supreme Court
created a five-factor test to determine whether identification evidence
violates due process under the “totality of the circumstances.”150 Five years
later, in Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court found that, under the Biggers test,
“[t]he admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and unnecessary
identification procedure does not violate due process so long as the
identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability.”151 That is, the Court
held that even suggestive and unnecessary identification procedures may be
reliable. Biggers and Manson eroded due process protection against
suggestive pretrial identifications so substantially that it arguably ceased to
exist. It could be said that the Manson Court brought the analysis to where it
began before Wade—as a challenge to the weight, and not the admissibility,
of the evidence:
[W]e cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case there is ‘a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ Short of that point, such evidence is for the
jury to weigh. We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American
juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the
jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight
of identification testimony that has some questionable feature. 152
(“At trial, an eyewitness’ artificially inflated confidence in an identification’s accuracy [based
on suggestive circumstances] complicates the jury’s task of assessing witness credibility and
reliability. It also impairs the defendant’s ability to attack the eyewitness’ credibility.”).
149
See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384–86 (1968) (showing the witness six
photographs in which the defendant appeared several times was not a violation of due process
“even though the identification procedure employed may have in some respects fallen short of
the ideal”); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198–200 (1972) (“It is the likelihood of
misidentification which violates a defendant’s right to due process[.] . . . But as Stovall makes
clear, the admission of evidence of a showup without more does not violate due process.”); cf.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 116 (1977) (affirming the statement in Biggers that
“[t]he admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and unnecessary identification
procedure does not violate due process so long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects
of reliability.”).
150
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200.
151
Manson, 432 U.S. at 106.
152
Id. at 116 (citing Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384 (1968)).
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Social science has since proved the Manson Court wrong and its test
woefully inadequate.153 Yet, the Manson due process analysis of the 1970s is
alive and well, and, today, is the leading framework used for assessing
eyewitness identification procedures in federal and state courts.154
To be clear, under the Manson framework, the burden rests on the
defendant to show why the identification was unduly suggestive.155 Even if
he is successful in meeting this burden, the court must still consider the
“totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the identification is
nonetheless reliable, despite its suggestiveness.156 To evaluate the totality of
circumstances and whether the identification is reliable, the court considers
the five Biggers factors: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at
the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention at the time of the
crime; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the defendant;
(4) the witness’s level of certainty when identifying the suspect at the
confrontation; and (5) the length of time that has elapsed between the crime
and the confrontation.157
The Manson analysis has failed to meet the Court’s goals of promoting
fairness and reliability to avoid misidentifications. The Biggers factors have
proven to be poor indicators of reliability, largely because the focus is based
strictly on information reported by a witness who may feel certain in his
memory, instead of on an examination of objective factors. If a suggestive
identification procedure takes place and the identification is excluded, the
court still asks the witness about his recollection of the crime. Yet, it is not
possible for the witness to distinguish between observations at the scene and
the subsequent suggestive identification because his mind will attempt to
make sense out of the entire event by making the two compatible.158 There is
153

See infra Part IV.
See e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 67 (2010) (instructing jurors to evaluate eyewitness testimony based on
the witness’s credibility and on the following factors: “(1) the capacity and opportunity of the
eyewitness to observe the offender based upon the length of time for observation and the
conditions at the time of observation, including lighting and distance; (2) whether the
identification was the product of the eyewitness’s own recollection or was the result of
subsequent influence or suggestiveness; (3) any inconsistent identifications made by the
eyewitness; (4) the witness’s familiarity with the subject identified; (5) the strength of earlier
and later identifications; (6) lapses of time between the event and the identification[s]; and (7)
the totality of circumstances surrounding the eyewitness’s identification”).
155
Manson, 432 U.S. at 117.
156
Id. at 110–14.
157
Id. at 114 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200).
158
See BARTLETT, supra note 54, at 14-15.
154
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no way to cleanse the memory of suggestion.159
Moreover, the Manson analysis does not take into account the results of
the last 30 years of social science research. As described above in Part II,
scientific studies have shown that the Manson approach uses an incomplete
list of factors, some of which can be skewed by faulty police practices. In
fact, an abundance of social science research indicates that eyewitnesses are
vulnerable to suggestion,160 and that in most criminal cases, the eyewitness’s
confidence has little or no correlation with accuracy. 161 In addition,
eyewitness confidence is extremely malleable, and, thus, easily enhanced
when an identification is confirmed by another witness or by the police.162
Although it seems that courts generally recognize that eyewitness
identifications may be unreliable,163 the Supreme Court is unlikely to revisit
its faulty due process analysis anytime soon. In January 2012, in Perry v.
New Hampshire, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of eyewitness
identification for the first time since 1977.164 It was clear to some observers
during oral arguments that “this case [was] not only the wrong vehicle for
solving the problem of mistaken eyewitness identifications, but that the
Supreme Court believe[d] itself the wrong institution to fix it.”165 The Court
ultimately ruled that the Due Process Clause does not require an inquiry into
159

See supra note 53. “The act of remembering, says eminent memory researcher
Professor Elizabeth F. Loftus of the University of California, Irvine, is more akin to putting
puzzle pieces together than retrieving a video recording.” Hal Arkowitz & Scott O.
Lillienfeld, Do the "Eyes" Have It? Sci. Am, Mind Jan./Feb. 2010, at 68, 69 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
160
See Bill Nettles et al., Eyewitness Identification: “I Notice You Paused on Number
Three,” 20 CHAMPION 10, 11 (1996).
161
Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy:
Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 817 (1995) (suggesting that
eyewitness’ confidence is “a dubious indicator” of eyewitness accuracy.)
162
See generally Elin M. Skagerberg, Co-Witness Feedback in Line-Ups, 21 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 489 (2007).
163
As Justice Elena Kagan put it, new research “should lead us all to wonder about the
reliability of eyewitness testimony.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Perry v. New
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10–8974), available at http://www.supremecourt.
gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-8974.pdf; Adam Liptak, Often Wrong but
Rarely in Doubt: Eyewitness IDs Will Get a Fresh Look, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at A14
(“[T]here is no area in which social science research has done more to illuminate a legal issue.
More than 2,000 studies on the topic have been published in professional journals in the past
30 years.”).
164
132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012).
165
Dahlia Lithwick, See No Evil, SLATE (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2011/11/perry_v_new_ hampshire_the_
supreme_court_looks_at_eyewitness_evid.html.
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the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification is not
obtained under “unnecessarily suggestive” circumstances created by law
enforcement.166
In Perry, the defendant was convicted of unauthorized removal of
private property.167 The police questioned a witness who had called the police
to check on a “tall black man” allegedly breaking into cars in her apartment
building’s parking lot in the early morning hours.168 She then went to the
kitchen window of her apartment, looked out, and identified a suspect in the
parking lot—the only black person standing next to a police officer who had
come to investigate.169 About a month later, that witness could not pick out
the same person from a photo array.170
At trial, the witness was permitted to testify to her out-of-court
identification of the defendant over defense counsel’s objection that the
identification at the scene was the result of the suggestive circumstances.171
In rejecting the defendant’s due process challenge, the Supreme Court
explained that the purpose of the Court’s precedents going back to 1967 was
to deter police from arranging identifications that were so suggestive that the
witness had no option but to pick out the suspect on which the police were
focusing.172 In Perry, the Court found that such deterrence was not at issue
because the police had not arranged the identification in a suggestive way.173
Despite a nod to “the importance [and] fallibility of eyewitness
identification,”174 the Court made no attempt to discuss the relevance of the
Manson analysis or indicate any willingness to revisit it. The Court did,
however, recognize the role of state courts in addressing and weighing
eyewitness evidence.175
And it has been the state courts that have led the way toward significant
change.

166

Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728.
Id. at 722.
168
Id. at 721.
169
Id. at 722.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 724.
173
Id. at 728.
174
Id. at 727.
175
Id. at 729 (“State and federal rules of evidence, moreover, permit trial judges to exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact or
potential for misleading the jury.”) (citations omitted).
167
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C. RULINGS BY STATE COURTS ARE BEGINNING TO FORCE THE LAW
TO CATCH UP WITH THE SCIENCE ON EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATIONS

Before addressing in-court identifications specifically, it is important to
point out that, even prior to the groundbreaking state supreme court rulings
in New Jersey in 2011 and Oregon in 2012, a handful of other state courts
had rejected, departed from, or made adjustments to the Manson analysis in
an attempt to bring their tests for determining the reliability of identification
evidence more in line with scientific research. Each of these states has come
up with its own way of trying to distinguish a reliable identification from an
unreliable identification, although all of them agree that a pure Manson
analysis is insufficient.
For example, Massachusetts flatly rejected Manson and, instead, held
tightly to the rule from Wade/Gilbert/Stovall, requiring per se exclusion of
unnecessarily suggestive identifications while permitting subsequent
identifications if based on an independent source. 176 In 1995, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the Manson “‘reliability
test’ is unacceptable because it provides little or no protection from
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures, from mistaken
identifications and, ultimately, from wrongful convictions.”177 Although the
Manson Court “discussed the public interest in deterring police from using
identification procedures which are unnecessarily suggestive,” the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that, in fact, “the reliability test
does little or nothing” to accomplish this goal.178 Instead, “the show-up has
flourished” under Manson and “[a]lmost any suggestive lineup will still meet
reliability standards.”179 The Massachusetts court refused the prosecution’s
invitation to abandon the per se exclusionary rule, which, it believed, is the
only option to “ensure the continued protection against the danger of
mistaken identification and wrongful convictions.”180
176

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1264 (Mass. 1995) (“The [Manson]
reliability test hinders, rather than aids, the fair and just administration of justice by permitting
largely unreliable evidence to be admitted directly on the issue of the defendant’s guilt or
innocence.”). Note that as discussed in the Introduction above and below in Part IV, in 2014,
Massachusetts convened a special committee to study the science and law regarding
eyewitness identification and recommended numerous changes to the law, including taking
judicial notice of the 30 years of science reviewed and accepted by the Henderson and Lawson
courts. See supra note 35.
177
Id. at 1262.
178
Id. at 1262–63.
179
Id. at 1263.
180
Id. at 1265.
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Other states have raised concerns about the federal standard for
eyewitness evidence. Even before Massachusetts rejected the federal
reliability test, the Court of Appeals of New York concluded that additional
protections above the federal standard were required under its state
constitution. 181 In addition, the New York court condemned the use of a
show-up at the police station when the suspects were viewed in custody,
which the court dubbed the “ideal of suggestibility.”182 And the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in 2005, adopted a per se exclusionary rule for unnecessary
show-up identifications.183
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the Biggers/Manson
factors fail primarily because they were created by lawyers and judges rather
than those with a real working knowledge of the human mind—the
scientists. 184 The Utah court observed that, “courts and lawyers tend to
‘ignore the teachings of other disciplines, especially when they contradict
long-accepted legal notions,’” leading to a “lag between the assumptions
embodied in the law and the findings of other disciplines[.]” 185 The Utah
court attempted to bring the law more in line with science by changing the
factors to be considered. 186 The factor tests in whatever form, however,
continue to mistakenly focus on self-reported information from a witness
who firmly believes in his or her own memory and is unaware of how outside
factors may have impacted that memory.
181

People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383–84 (N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 383 (“Long before the Supreme Court entered the field this court expressed
concern for, and devised evidentiary rules to minimize the risk of misidentification. After the
Supreme Court condemned the practice of police arranged showups and established minimum
standards for pretrial identifications this court found that additional protections were needed
under the State Constitution.”) (citations omitted).
183
State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 593–94 (Wis. 2005) (“We conclude that evidence
obtained from an out-of-court showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible
unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was necessary. A showup will
not be necessary, however, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or, as a
result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a lineup or photo array.”).
184
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991).
185
Id. (citation omitted).
186
Id. at 781 (citing the relevant factors as: “(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view
the actor during the event; (2) the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the
event; (3) the witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental
acuity; (4) whether the witness’s identification was made spontaneously and remained
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the
event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate
it correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in
the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor
was the same as the observer’s”) (citing State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)).
182
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The per se exclusionary rule has historically been the driving force
behind progress toward deterring unnecessarily suggestive eyewitness
identifications. According to Professor Sandra Guerra Thompson, “[o]ver
time, a per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive identification
practices tends to create, through a case-by-case method, a set of best
practices,” which leads to further rulings defining suggestive procedures.187
States are beginning to implement best practices as a result. For example,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Connecticut, as well as the cities of Dallas,
Minneapolis, Boston, Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco, Tucson,
Denver, and Northampton, have implemented more reliable procedures for
lineups.188 And in Georgia, Oregon, Virginia, Texas, Wisconsin, and Rhode
Island, law enforcement trainings have recommended or promulgated
voluntary guidelines for more reliable lineups.189 More recently, in 2013, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police called for changes in conducting
investigations, including modifying eyewitness identification procedures.190
As the number of cities and states instituting more stringent
requirements for pretrial identifications grows, police and prosecutors will
inevitably opt for first time, in-court identifications when the witness gives
only a general description after the crime, like the witnesses in Hickman.191
Accordingly, prosecutors may choose to forego the stringent pretrial
identification procedures altogether, and, instead, take advantage of the incourt identification where the witness will see the defendant seated at the
defense table having been charged with the crime. In order to prevent a shift
toward this less reliable procedure in the wake of increasingly stringent state
standards for the admissibility of eyewitness testimony subjected to a pretrial
procedure, a per se exclusionary approach to first time, in-court
identifications is needed. This approach should encourage the use of reliable
out-of-court procedures, pretrial or with leave during trial.
187
Sandra Guerra Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as Guardians
Against Wrongful Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 614–15 (2010).
188
Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCEPROJECT.ORG, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/Eyewitness_Identification_Reform.php (last accessed on Oct. 9, 2014).
189
Id.
190
Spencer S. Hsu, Police Chiefs Lead Effort to Prevent Wrongful Convictions by Altering
Investigative Practices, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/crime/police-chiefs-urge-changes-to-photo-lineups-other-tools-to-prevent-wrong
ful-convictions/2013/12/02/5d8e9af2-5b69-11e3-bf7e-f567ee61ae21_story.html; see Int’l
Chiefs of Police, Model Policy: Showups, Photographic Identifications, and Lineups
(Jun. 2006), http://dpa.ky.gov/nr/rdonlyres/be390c82-e7dd-4a1e-8a3a-4702c5110cd1/0/
internationalassocofchiefsofpolice.pdf.
191
See discussion, supra note 18.
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IV. APPLYING THE SCIENCE TO FIRST TIME IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS
A. COURTS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED FIRST TIME, IN-COURT
IDENTIFICATIONS IN THE PAST DID NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT OF
RECENT SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS AND FAILED TO
UNDERSTAND THE SCOPE OF THE SUGGESTION

To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed a claim of
suggestiveness resulting from a first time, in-court identification. Lower
federal and state courts have taken different approaches as to how such claims
should be analyzed. 192 The Oregon Supreme Court was the first court to
tackle the issue in a jurisdiction that accepts the advances in eyewitness
science discussed above, but, unfortunately, fell back on the mistaken
analysis applied in past cases, all of which were decided without the benefit
of the science.193
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in its recent decision in
Crayton, was the first state supreme court to exclude a first time, in-court
identification. The court did so by analogizing the identification to a “showup,” which was already deemed “unnecessarily suggestive” under
Massachusetts law.194 The Crayton court, therefore, did not discuss in detail
the additional scientific bases for finding a first time, in-court identification
unreliable. 195 Other courts around the country, however, do not have the
192

See United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1992) (adopting Biggers totality of
circumstances test to first time, in-court identifications); United States v. Rundell, 858 F.2d
425 (8th Cir. 1988) (adopting a two-step test under Biggers totality of circumstances test to
determine the admissibility of in-court identification); United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d
938 (2d Cir. 1984) (deciding that in-court identification was impermissibly suggestive where
defendant was the only black person in the courtroom and was seated next to defense counsel).
The Supreme Court, however, has not decided whether Manson applies to first time, in-court
identifications. See, e.g., United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The
Supreme Court has not extended its exclusionary rule to in-court identification procedures that
are suggestive because of the trial setting.”).
193
See discussion, supra note 22.
194
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Mass. 2014) (citing Commonwealth
v. Phillips, 897 N.E.2d 31, 42 (Mass. 2008)); Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 560–
61 (Mass. 2006).
195
Crayton, 21 N.E.3d at 166. The court also held that a first time, in-court identification
may be admissible where there is “good reason.” Id. at 170–72. “Good reason” may exist, the
court held, where the eyewitness was familiar with the defendant before the commission of
the crime, such as in domestic violence cases. Id. at 160. “Good reason” may also exist the
witness is an arresting officer who was also a witness to the commission of the crime and who
is testifying that the defendant is, in fact, the person who was arrested for the crime. Id. In both
circumstances, the Crayton court recognized, “the in-court showup is understood by the jury
as confirmation that the defendant sitting in the court room is the person whose conduct is at
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benefit of such established precedent or an understanding of the science.
Before Crayton, the majority of courts had concluded that the
suggestion does not arise in the first place because “the judge is present and
can adequately address relevant problems; the jury is physically present to
witness the identification, rather than merely hearing testimony about it; and
cross-examination offers defendants an adequate safeguard or remedy against
suggestive examinations.” 196 Some courts have held that, although
suggestive, first time, in-court identifications are nonetheless reliable under
the Biggers factors and a totality of the circumstances test.197
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Domina, discussed at length the
suggestiveness inherent in first time, in-court identifications, but still refused
to institute a rule requiring a non-suggestive identification.198 As the court
explained, “When the witness is asked [for the first time in court] if he or she
can identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, this is surely
equivalent to the ‘show-up’ pretrial situation. Only slightly less suggestive is
the procedure whereby the witness is asked if he or she can identify the
perpetrator of the crime from among those present in the courtroom when the
defendant is sitting at the defense counsel table.” 199 The court went on to
describe the problem: “When asked to point to the robber, an identification
witness—particularly if he has some familiarity with courtroom
issue rather than as identification evidence.” Id. Because the “good reason” exception is
reserved for contexts outside of a pure stranger identification, we do not discuss it here.
196
State v. Lewis, 609 S.E.2d 515, 518 (S.C. 2005); see also United States v. Bush, 749
F.2d 1227, 1231 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[D]eference shown the jury in weighing the reliability of
potentially suggestive out-of-court identification would seem even more appropriate for
in-court identifications where the jury is present and able to see first-hand the circumstances
which may influence a witness[.]”); Byrd v. State, 25 A.3d 761, 767 (Del. 2011) (citing Bush,
749 F.2d 1227); People v. Medina, 208 A.D.2d 771, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); People v.
Medina, 617 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“[W]here there has not been a pretrial
identification and defendant is identified in court for first time, defendant is not deprived of
fair trial because defendant is able to explore weaknesses and suggestiveness of identification
in front of the jury[.]”); State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 189 (Conn. 1986) (“The defendant’s
protection against the obvious suggestiveness in any courtroom identification confrontation is
his right to cross-examination.”); People v. Rodriguez, 134 Ill. App. 3d 582, 589 (1985)
(“Where a witness first identifies the defendant at trial, defense counsel may test perceptions,
memory, and bias of the witness, contemporaneously exposing weaknesses and adding
perspective to lessen hazards of undue weight or mistake.”); Ralston v. State, 309 S.E.2d 135,
136 (Ga. 1983).
197
See, e.g., Rundell, 858 F.2d at 426; Hill, 967 F.2d at 232; Code v. Montgomery, 725
F.2d 1316, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 1984).
198
784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986).
199
Id. at 1368 (citing United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 941–42, modified, 756
F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984), and United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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procedures—is quite likely to look immediately at the counsel table, where
the defendant is conspicuously seated in relative isolation. Thus the usual
physical setting of a trial may itself provide a suggestive setting for an eyewitness identification.”200 The court, nonetheless, shied away from the issue
because it believed that “[t]here is no constitutional entitlement to an in-court
lineup or other particular methods of lessening the suggestiveness of in-court
identification, such as seating the defendant elsewhere in the room.”201
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Archibald, took a step in the
right direction and its decision, according to Professor Evan Mandery,
“represents the high-water mark of protection afforded to suggestive in-court
identifications.”202 There, the defendant in a robbery case argued “that the incourt identifications were tainted by unduly suggestive circumstances,
namely, that throughout the trial he was the only black person in the
courtroom, except for one day when a black United States Marshal was
present, and that he was seated at the defense table.”203 At trial, the defendant
requested a corporeal lineup and asked “to be seated with five or six other
black men who looked reasonably like him, to ensure that he would not be
obviously singled out by an educated witness.”204 The trial court denied his
request as “inappropriate” and allowed the in-court identification. On appeal,
the Second Circuit hit the nail on the head:
As is generally the case, the defendant here was seated next to defense counsel during
the trial, a circumstance obviously suggestive to witnesses asked to make in-court
identifications. Any witness, especially one who has watched trials on television, can
determine which of the individuals in the courtroom is the defendant, which is the
defense lawyer, and which is the prosecutor.205

The appellate court held that while “there was no obligation to stage a
lineup, . . . there was, however, an obligation to ensure that the in-court
procedure here did not simply amount to a ‘show-up.’” 206 The court also
insightfully acknowledged the relative ease with which the prejudice could
have been prevented: “A fairly short delay of proceedings was all that would
have been required to rearrange the seating in the courtroom and to secure
the presence of some people of the defendant’s approximate age and skin

200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1970)).
Id. at 1369.
See Mandery, supra note 7, at 402.
Archibald, 734 F.2d at 940.
Id. at 941.
Id.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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color.”207
The Second Circuit ultimately ruled that the error in admitting the incourt identifications was harmless in light of other evidence to support the
conviction.208 While the court recognized the inherent suggestiveness of the
identification, the holding ultimately disregards the powerful effect that
identification evidence has on the jury, which is the reason courts should
institute a per se exclusionary approach and require an out-of-court lineup or
other non-suggestive procedures.
B. THE SCIENCE APPLIES TO FIRST TIME, IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS
JUST AS IT DOES TO PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATIONS, AND REQUIRES
THE SAME PROTECTIONS AGAINST MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION
EVIDENCE

Just this past year, in Oregon—a jurisdiction that has accepted and
altered its approach to admitting eyewitness identification testimony based
on the significant body of scientific research about human memory and its
impact on eyewitness identification—the state Supreme Court was presented
with a prime opportunity to institute a per se exclusionary approach to first
time, in-court identifications in Hickman, but refused to do so.209 Advocates
for enhanced safeguards against eyewitness misidentification had high hopes
for Hickman because the facts so strongly cautioned against the admissibility
of the first time, in-court identifications. One witness (D) told police on the
night of the shooting that she did not see the perpetrator. 210 Yet D was
permitted to testify at trial that she was 95 percent certain the shooter was the
defendant sitting before her. 211 The other witness (N) gave only a vague
description of a stocky black male in his mid-twenties on the night of the
shooting. 212 She, too, was allowed to testify at trial that the shooter was
207

Id. at 942.
Id. at 943.
209
State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551 (Or. 2014). We use the Hickman case as an example
because it is the first case that addresses first time, in-court stranger identifications in a
jurisdiction that has accepted the recent advances in social science on human memory and its
impact on identifications. The authors of this article, through the Oregon Innocence Project,
submitted an amicus brief on this issue to the Oregon Supreme Court in Hickman, urging the
Court to adopt a bright line rule prohibiting first time, in-court stranger identifications. Brief
of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network and Oregon Innocence Project in Support of
Respondent, State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551 (Or. 2014), (No. 081235225), 2014 WL 1227589,
at *19.
210
Id. at 568.
211
Id. at 556.
212
Id.
208
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Hickman, the black twenty-something male sitting before her.213
The Hickman court started from the faulty premise that memory
contamination will manifest itself in a way that is self-evident to the jury.214
The court refused to recognize that suggestiveness inside the courtroom may
irreparably contaminate a witness’s mind to form an unreliable “memory” of
the incident, which may be mistaken yet convincing to a jury. Instead, the
Hickman court relied heavily on the misguided notion that the jury can assess
the credibility of a first time, in-court identification because the jury can
observe the witness’s demeanor, including facial expressions, voice
inflection, and body language, during the identification process. 215 The
Hickman court failed to recognize that a witness’s demeanor can only tell us
how certain the witness is in her or his own mind. As science has proved time
and time again, certainty does not equal reliability. 216 Rather, “most
eyewitnesses think they are telling the truth even when their testimony is
inaccurate, and ‘[b]ecause the eyewitness is testifying honestly (i.e.,
sincerely), he or she will not display the demeanor of the dishonest or biased
witness.’”217 Indeed, even some mistaken eyewitnesses will “exude supreme
confidence in their identifications.”218
Hickman is especially disappointing in light of earlier decisions in State
v. Henderson,219 from the New Jersey Supreme Court, and State v. Lawson,220
from the Oregon Supreme Court—two landmark cases leading the way for
the application of social science to eyewitness identification evidence. 221
Both Henderson and Lawson embrace the idea of assessing the reliability of
identification evidence based on advances in science that have dramatically
improved our understanding of the way in which the mind works. 222 That
213
214
215
216
217

772).

218

Id. at 562.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 564.
See supra Section II.C.
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 889 (N.J. 2011) (quoting Epstein, supra note 44, at

Id.
Id. at 894.
220
291 P.3d 673, 685 (Or. 2012).
221
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s “Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence”
also recommended analyzing eyewitness identification evidence using the new advances in
memory science to determine admissibility and create a heightened gatekeeping function for
trial courts. See supra note 35, at 12–13. The Massachusetts court showed a willingness to put
some teeth behind that gatekeeping function when it excluded the first time, in-court
identification in Crayton. Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 169 (Mass. 2014).
222
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 894; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 684.
219
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body of scientific evidence from which Henderson and Lawson emerged
points to the fallibility of human memory, the inability of the average juror
to distinguish credibility from confidence, and the frequency with which
laypeople hold beliefs contrary to the weight of scientific evidence.223 The
fact that Hickman came out of a jurisdiction that accepts this science-based
analysis is troubling—the court should have embraced the same concerns.
The scientific research adopted in Henderson and Lawson is organized
by system variables, those factors within the control of those administrating
an identification procedure, and estimator variables, those factors that are
beyond the control of the criminal justice system that are “equally capable of
affecting an eyewitness’ ability to perceive and remember an event.”224 Using
this framework to create a more informed understanding of the human
memory, the Henderson and Lawson courts rejected the Manson test as
inadequate. 225 Henderson specifically recognized that the Manson test
“overstates the jury’s inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by
eyewitnesses who honestly believe their testimony is accurate.” 226 Courts,
like Hickman, that continue to rely on the jury to ferret out unreliable
identification evidence have failed to fully grasp the science that should
inform these decisions.
Memory contamination does not appear on the witness’s face like a
“tell” in poker.227 Thus, Henderson and Lawson hold that the court, rather
than the jury, must assess the reliability of identification evidence using
certain guideposts for admissibility. 228 Although the courts in those cases
focused on suggestiveness resulting from pretrial identification procedures,
the concerns underlying those procedures are unmistakable in first time, incourt identifications. The same concerns that compelled the Henderson and
Lawson courts to re-examine the standard for the admissibility of pretrial
identifications should compel courts to re-examine the admissibility of first
time, in-court identifications. We discuss several of these concerns in turn.
Targeted Suspect: Courts around the country recognize the inherent
danger of an identification procedure in which the witness is aware of whom
police officers have targeted as a suspect.229 With that danger in mind, many
223

See supra Part II.
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 904; see also Lawson, 291 P.3d at 684.
225
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 889–92; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 684.
226
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878.
227
See supra Section II.C.
228
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 690.
229
See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 183 (N.J. 2006) (“[O]ne-on-one showups are
inherently suggestive . . . because the victim can only choose from one person.” (internal
224
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courts, including Henderson and Lawson, have uniformly denounced the
“show-up” as “inherently suggestive.”230 Identification procedures involving
a single suspect fail to “provide a safeguard against witnesses with poor
memories or those inclined to guess, because every mistaken identification
in a showup will point to the suspect.”231 A number of states have limited the
admissibility of show-ups. 232 The same construct, however, exists in first
time, in-court identifications, which have yet to be ruled inadmissible—the
sole exception being the recent (2014) state supreme court ruling in
Massachusetts.233 In a first time, in-court identification, the witness is acutely
aware that the individual seated at the defense table has been targeted by the
police and the state as the perpetrator. A fact that cannot be ignored is that
the state believes so strongly in that individual’s guilt that he or she has been
called to trial. The first time, in-court identification presents the ultimate
“targeted suspect” situation that courts have repeatedly condemned in the
pretrial context.
Expectancy Effect: Psychologists define the “expectancy effect” as “the
tendency for experimenters to obtain results they expect . . . because they
have helped to shape that response.”234 The Henderson and Lawson courts
focused on the expectancy effect in lineups and found that even with the best
of intentions, an administrator with knowledge of the suspect’s identity may
inadvertently sway the witness through language and subtle cues, including
“pauses, gestures, hesitations, or smiles.” 235 Studies show “that both
witnesses and administrators are generally unconscious of the influence that
the lineup administrator’s behavior has on identification process.” 236
Henderson and Lawson, therefore, recommended double-blind lineup
procedures where the administrator “is not investigating the particular case
citation omitted)); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582–84 (Wis. 2005) (“[E]vidence obtained
from an out-of-court showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless . . . the
procedure was necessary.”); People v. Riley, 517 N.E.2d 520, 524 (N.Y. 1987) (“Showup
identifications, by their nature suggestive, are strongly disfavored but are permissible if
exigent circumstances require immediate identification[.]” (internal citation omitted)).
230
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 902–03; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 686.
231
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 903.
232
Id. (citing cases limiting the admissibility of show-ups).
233
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 169 (Mass. 2014).
234
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896 (citing Robert Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin, Interpersonal
Expectancy Effects: The First 345 Studies, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 377, 377 (1978)).
235
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Lawson, 291 P.3d at 685–86.
236
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 706 (citing Ryann M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of
Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 1106, 1110 (2004)).
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and does not know who the suspect is.”237 At a minimum, the courts urge a
blind lineup where the administrator may know who the suspect is, but does
not know where he or she is located in the lineup or photo array.238
There is no chance for a non-blind procedure in a first time, in-court
identification. The prosecutor, the witness, and everyone else in the
courtroom are aware that the suspect is the individual seated at the defense
table. There is no way to safeguard the witness from influence caused by
subtle cues in the prosecutor’s questioning or not-so-subtle cues in the
courtroom itself. The expectation that the witness identify the defendant is
palpable and may have a powerful effect on the reliability of an identification.
Lucky Guesses: “Properly constructed lineups test a witness’ memory
and decrease the chance that a witness is simply guessing.”239 Henderson and
Lawson, therefore, discussed at length the need for identification procedures,
like lineups, that include look-alike “fillers.”240 “The reason is simple: an
array of look-alikes forces witnesses to examine their memory.” 241 Both
courts recognized that “if for any reason a suspect disproportionately stands
out from the lineup fillers surrounding him or her, then the identification
procedure is suggestive—and the reliability of any resulting identification
decreases correspondingly.”242 The suggestion is obvious with a first time,
in-court identification. The suspect stands out in the courtroom, sitting at the
defense table in near isolation, and there are no look-alikes surrounding him
or her to test the eyewitness’s memory. The witness is not asked to examine
her memory and, instead, is expected to simply point at the defendant who
the state has already identified as the perpetrator. The “guess” is not only
lucky, it is inevitable.
Further, because the defendant stands out behind the defense table,
similar to a pretrial procedure where the suspect clearly stands out from the
rest, a witness may experience increased “confidence in the identification
because the selection process seemed easy.” 243 The inflated sense of
confidence has a powerful effect on the jury, thereby undermining the jury’s
237

Henderson, 27 A.3d at 897; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 706.
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 897 (suggesting a procedure known as the “envelope method,”
where a single-blind administrator “who knows the suspect’s identity places [photos] into
different envelopes, shuffles them, and presents them to the witness” without “looking at the
envelopes or pictures while the witness makes an identification”).
239
Id.
240
Id. at 887; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 706–07.
241
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 898.
242
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 707.
243
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 898 (internal citation omitted).
238
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ability to effectively weigh the credibility of the identification.244
Relative Judgment: “Relative judgment refers to the fact that the
witness seems to be choosing the lineup member who most resembles the
witnesses’ memory relative to other lineup members.”245 Studies prove that
“if the actual perpetrator is not in a lineup, people may be inclined to choose
the best look-alike.”246 In fact, “field experiments suggest that when the true
perpetrator is not in the lineup, eyewitnesses may nonetheless select an
innocent suspect more than one-third of the time.” 247 The courts in
Henderson and Lawson advocate for pre-lineup instructions to reduce the
possibility of the relative judgment phenomenon.248 That is, studies conclude
“that the likelihood of misidentification is significantly decreased when
witnesses are instructed prior to an identification procedure that a suspect
may or may not be in the lineup or photo array, and that it is permissible not
to identify anyone.” 249 Implicit in this conclusion, however, is that the
witness must actually believe that the premise of the instruction is true—that
the perpetrator may, in fact, be absent from the lineup. With a first time, incourt identification, this premise is hardly plausible, as the witness knows
that the state firmly believes that the perpetrator is sitting at the defense table.
Telling a witness that the perpetrator may or may not be in the courtroom is
a glaring pretense. Relative judgment is likely to influence the identification
when the witness knows that the state believes the individual at the defense
table to be guilty.
Suggestive Feedback: Feedback from police or prosecutors after an
identification “affects the reliability of an identification in that it can distort
memory, create a false sense of confidence, and alter a witness’s report of
how he or she viewed an event.”250 For example, “those who receive a simple
post-identification confirmation regarding the accuracy of their identification
significantly inflate their reports to suggest better witnessing conditions at
the time of the crime, stronger memory at the time of the lineup, and sharper

244

Id. at 889 (“[W]e are mindful of the observation that ‘there is almost nothing more
convincing [to a jury] than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the
defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’” (citing Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1979)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
245
Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
89, 92 (1984) (citation omitted).
246
Id. (citation omitted).
247
Id. at 887–88 (emphasis added).
248
Id. at 897; State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 706 (N.J. 2012).
249
Id.
250
Id. at 900.
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memory abilities in general.”251 In others words, confirming feedback in the
courtroom can bolster the witness’s confidence that he or she has selected the
“right” person. The Lawson court agreed that “the danger of confirming
feedback lies in its tendency to increase the appearance of reliability without
increasing reliability itself.” 252 There is no greater risk of confirming
feedback than in the trial setting. Once the witness has identified the
defendant as the perpetrator, the prosecution will continue to ask questions
designed to elicit details confirming the witness’s certitude. The witness’s
exclusive role is to answer questions and prove how certain she is. The simple
act of continuing the questioning tells the witness that he or she was “right,”
allowing her to respond to cross-examination and other scrutiny with greater
confidence borne out of the approbation of the figures of authority in the
courtroom. The witness’s subsequent account of other details surrounding the
event may become distorted or presented with false confidence, increasing
the apparent credibility of the identification itself.
Memory Decay: Memory decay is irreversible and occurs at an
exponential rather than a linear rate, with the greatest proportion of memory
loss occurring shortly after the event and the rate of memory loss leveling off
over time.253 Consequently, the longer the delay between the crime and the
identification, the greater the likelihood for misidentification. While
researchers cannot pinpoint the exact moment when a witness’s recall
becomes unreliable, one of the studies relied upon by the Henderson court
demonstrates a substantial increase in misidentification from two to twentyfour hours after an event.254 “Scientists generally agree that memory never
improves,” and the probative value of an identification conducted after a
significant event also turns on the quality of the original memory based on
the other estimator variables.255 An identification that happens for the first
time in the courtroom will necessarily occur long after the crime itself. The
state is asking the witness to identify the perpetrator sometimes years after
the event and under the most suggestive of conditions—when the state has
already identified the perpetrator and seated him prominently before the
witness. That witness is highly susceptible to influence.
The courts in Henderson and Lawson articulated each of these concerns
251

Id. at 899 (quoting Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in
Eyewitness: A Meta-Analysis of the Post-identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 864–65 (2006) (citation omitted)).
252
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 710.
253
Id. at 688.
254
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 907.
255
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 705 (citing Henderson, 72 A.3d at 907).
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about influence in identification procedures, but, because the concerns were
discussed in the context of pretrial identifications under the facts of those
cases, the court in Hickman chose not to recognize the parallels to first time,
in-court identifications.
Many courts, including Hickman, have fallen back on the mistaken (but
widely held) belief that suggestiveness, if any, can be “cured” for the jury
through cross-examination, expert testimony, or jury instructions. 256 The
problem is that the mere recognition of system variables or estimator
variables does not make a trier of fact any more adept at being able to
distinguish a reliable identification from an identification contaminated by
outside forces.257 Scientists agree that “one cannot know for certain which
identifications are accurate and which are false—which are the product of
reliable memories and which are distorted by one of a number of factors.”258
Mistaken eyewitness identifications often stem not from malice, but
from the witness’s honest belief in the accuracy of his or her own memory.
Traditional trial tools are ineffective at exposing an honest, but nevertheless
mistaken, witness. Cross-examination, for example, “will often expose a lie
or half-truth, but may be far less effective when witnesses, although
mistaken, believe that what they say is true.”259 Although acting in good faith,
“eyewitnesses are likely to use their ‘expectations, personal experience,
biases, and prejudices’ to fill in the gaps created by imperfect memory.
Because it is unlikely that witnesses will be aware that this process has
occurred, they may express far more confidence in the identification than is
warranted.”260 The Crayton court recognized that the jury’s ability to view
the in-court identification and assess the witness’s confidence does not make
the jury better able to evaluate the accuracy of the identification because
256

State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 564–65 (Or. 2014).
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 911 (discussing a study that revealed not only that mock jurors
“were insensitive to the effects of [a suggestive identification procedure, but that they also]
gave disproportionate weight to the confidence of the witness, [leading scientists to]
conclude[] that jurors do not evaluate eyewitness memory in a manner consistent with
psychological theory and findings” (citing Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 186–87 (1990)).
258
Id. at 888.
259
State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1110 (Utah 2009) (citing Jacqueline McMurtrie, The
Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271,
1277 (2005); Peter J. Cohen, How Shall they be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE. L. REV. 237, 273 (1996)).
260
Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1110 (citing Steve D. Charman & Gary L. Wells, Can
Eyewitnesses Correct for External Influences on Their Lineup Identifications? The
Actual/Counterfactual Assessment Paradigm, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 5, 5
(2008) (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489 (1986)).
257
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confidence does not equate to accuracy.261 Cross-examination is especially
inadequate to reveal weaknesses when the identification happens for the first
time in court because the identification was not tested pretrial—without the
suggestiveness of the in-court procedure—for comparison.
Jury instructions, too, have also proved ineffective to “cure” the
prejudice from a mistaken identification. 262 The Henderson and Lawson
courts recognized that not only are laypersons largely unfamiliar with
scientific evidence relating to memory and suggestiveness, but also
individuals often hold beliefs that go against the weight of scientific
evidence.263 The use of jury instructions to educate the jury on the reliability
of eyewitness identifications has been shown to have little effect on what
jurors intuitively believe about memory, with one study relied upon in
Henderson showing that mock jurors “were insensitive to the effects of
[estimator variables], retention interval, suggestive lineup instructions, and
procedures used for constructing and carrying out the lineup,” but
nevertheless “gave disproportionate weight to the confidence of the
witness.”264 In fact, experts find that “eyewitness confidence [is] the most
powerful predictor of verdicts regardless of other variables.”265
For the same reasons, expert testimony cannot cure the prejudice from
a suggestive identification. Scientists find that, although experts can inform
jurors about the factors that may make an identification particularly
unreliable, experts cannot help the jury determine whether any particular
identification is accurate or not. 266 A first time, in-court identification is,
therefore, subject to many of the concerns condemned in pretrial
identifications because of the tendency to create suggestiveness in the
encounter, which cannot be cured by traditional trial techniques. A few rare
courts have recognized that the setting of the courtroom is inherently
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suggestive and encouraged the permissive grant of a pretrial lineup.267 Many,
however, have explicitly stated that a pretrial lineup procedure is not a
prerequisite to every in-court identification.268
Absent a way to cure the suggestiveness of a first time, in-court
identification, courts should encourage out-of-court identification procedures
either pretrial or with leave during trial by prohibiting the first time, in-court
identification.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts must either accept the science or not. It is disingenuous to accept
the science when it comes to analyzing pretrial identifications, while refusing
to accept that the same science informs in-court identifications.
For those courts that accept the science proving our memories are
exceptionally malleable, the suggestion arising inside the courtroom must be
recognized and guarded against. The same concerns courts have articulated
in the pretrial context exist in the context of first time, in-court identifications.
As courts begin to create more reliable pretrial procedures, the courts must
also encourage the use of those procedures by prohibiting first time, in-court
identifications, which circumvent all of the precautionary measures designed
to prevent misidentifications, such as blind administration, lineups that
include look-alike fillers, pre-identification instructions, and non-suggestive
questioning. The first time, in-court identification, instead, has all the
suggestiveness of a show-up and should be similarly banned.
We propose that courts require prosecutors to disclose witnesses who
may be asked to identify the defendant during trial and prohibit the question
from being asked of those who have not made a pretrial identification.
Prosecutors can avoid witness disqualification with relative ease by
attempting a pretrial identification. For the rare situation in which logistics
or timing prevent a pretrial identification, courts should permit prosecutors
to take leave of trial to attempt a non-suggestive, out-of-court identification.
At a minimum, courts should replicate non-suggestive procedures by
arranging a reliable lineup inside the courtroom and preventing the witness
267
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from seeing the defendant beforehand.
Preventing misidentifications that lead to wrongful convictions far
outweighs the minimal inconvenience to the process and should be, always,
our priority.
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